Comments

Wetland Protection Under Section 404
of the Clean Water Act: An Enforcement

Paradox

"My position on wetlands is straightforward:All existing wetlands, no matter how small, should be preserved."
- President George Bush'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 404 of the Clean Water, Act of 19772 is designed to protect some of the most sensitive and functionally valuable resources in
America: our nation's wetlands.3 In the short history of the Act, a
paradox has emerged between this purported intention of the Act
and its enforcement. The paradox is that strong legislation exists to
protect our nation's waters and wetlands,4 but it is administered by
agencies that appear reluctant to enforce its provisions.5 A backup
program is available to citizens to ensure enforcement, but it is constrained by judicial interpretations which make it virtually unusable.
Administration occurs under an alliance of two agencies that have
1. SPORTS AFIELD, Oct. 1988, at 15.
2. Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
3. "The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
4. See id. § 1311.

5. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WETLANDS: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' ADMINISTRATION OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM 3 (1988) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

historically held diametrically opposed views toward wetlands and
their use. Moreover, there has been a continuing loss of wetland
habitat despite public opinion polls and Presidential orders favoring
their protection.6
This Comment investigates the reasons for this apparent paradox,
focusing on the dual problems of agency conflicts in enforcement and
judicial reticence in interpreting the ability of citizens to compel enforcement. Included is an overview of recent legislative and judicial
changes which indicate a more consistent future for the enforcement
of section 404. Finally, this Comment suggests changes in the system
that would promote a more uniform administration of that section.

II.

BACKGROUND

Wetlands have been described as "among the most important ecosystems on the Earth." 7 Economically, they are an integral part of a

$10 billion United States commercial fishery and a fur industry valued at up to $400 million annually. They account for over $10 billion spent annually on outdoor recreation. 8 They are also very important hydrologically 9 and biologically.10
Unfortunately, these values have not always been known or appreciated. Actually, the destruction of wetland areas was encouraged by
the federal government for most of the last 200 years.11 Since colo6. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,990, 3 C.F.R. 121 (1978), reprintedin 42 U.S.C.

§ 4321 (1988).
7.

W. MITSCH & J. GOSSELINK, WETLANDS 3 (1986).

8. For a more detailed listing of benefits of wetlands, see NATIONAL WILDLIFE
FEDERATION, STATUS REPORT ON OUR NATION'S WETLANDS 7-8 (1987) [hereinafter
NWF,STATUS REPORT]; see also W. MITSCH & J. GOSSELINK, supra note 7, at 393-414.
9. Although wetlands are often considered valuable as wildlife habitats, they also
have been described as "the kidneys of the landscape" for the important functional values they hold in flood control, water quality purification, and groundwater replacement.
W. MITSCH & J. GOSSELINK, supra note 7, at 3. Though more difficult to estimate, the
economic benefits of these hydrologic functions of wetlands greatly exceed the economic
benefit derived from commercial and recreational activities. See NWF, STATUS REPORT,
supra note 8, at 8-9.
10. Wetlands provide habitats for a myriad of wildlife, including many endangered
species. In many regions where wetland acreage has been drastically depleted (for example, in southern California), this function drives many of the wetland management decisions because the continued existence of these species depends on the preservation and
restoration of what little wetland area remains. J. ZEDLER, SALT MARSH RESTORATION:
A GUIDEBOOK FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 7 (1984).

11. W. MITSCH & J. GOSSELINK, supra note 7, at 7. As early as 1763, George
Washington was active in draining the Great Dismal Swamp in Virginia. In the mid1800s, the Swamp Lands Acts provided an official federal policy of encouraging states to
drain and fill wetlands for land reclamation. In 1906 the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) began surveying wetland area for the purpose of agricultural conversion. This policy was continued in the 1940s by the Soil Conservation Service and
again by the USDA in 1953. NWF.STATUS REPORT, supra note 8, at 28. For a brief
history of United States wetlands policies, see also NWF, STATUS REPORT, supra note 8,
at 28-35.
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nial times, wetland acreage in the continental United States has decreased by as much as fifty percent.1 2 Wetland loss has resulted from
drainage for agricultural conversion, 13 filling for urban development, 4 water diversion for irrigation, 1 5 and subtle degradation from
contaminants.' 6 However, as the physical and ecological importance
of wetlands becomes more widely recognized and the hazards of wetland destruction become increasingly evident,' 7 political leaders have
begun to 8emphasize the need to protect and preserve this important
resource.'

A.

The Clean Water Act

In the early 1970s, federal policy regarding the protection of wetlands was contradictory. The Department of Interior was arguing for
wetland protection, while the policies of other agencies, such as the
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), continued to encourage wetland
destruction.' 9 At the same time, Congress was creating a series of
amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948,

later to become the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA).2 0 The objec12. Estimates range from 30-50%, depending on the methods used in determining
the geographic limits of wetland acreage-current rates of wetland loss are projected at
approximately 300,000 acres per year. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSNiENT,

WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION, OTA-O-2063

(1984)

[hereinafter

OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION].
13. NWF, STATUS REPORT, supra note 8, at 28, 30-31.
14. Id. at 31-32.
15. Id. at 34.
16. Id. at 33.
17. For a more complete discussion on the hazards of wetland loss, see J. KUSLER,
OUR NATIONAL WETLAND HERITAGE, A PROTECTION GUIDEBOOK 4-7 (1983).
18. Nonregulatory programs such as the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act
of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to -11 (1989), the Water Bank Program Act of 1970, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1311 (1989), and the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, 16
U.S.C. §§ 3901, 3902 (1989), have reflected this sentiment. In 1977, President Carter
issued Exec. Order No. 11,990, 3 C.F.R., 121 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1988), requiring all federal agencies to consider the impact of their activities on wetland
resources. Finally, the wetlands issue became a popular political issue in the 1988 Presidential campaign, with George Bush promising a strong environmental stand on wetlands
issues if elected. SPORTS AFIELD, Oct. 1988, at 13, 15, 18. Following through on this
promise, President Bush selected Conservation Foundation President and wetland advocate William Reilly as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Chief.
19. These policies included construction of flood control projects, reservoirs, seawalls, and groins which destroyed millions of acres of wetlands. The Soil Conservation
Service and Bureau of Land Reclamation were also involved with wetland destruction
policies, providing incentives to farmers who drained wetland areas for agricultural purposes. See J. KUSLER, supra note 17, at 55-56; W. MITSCH & J. GOSSELINK, supra note
7, at 441-42.
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).

tive of the CWA was "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. '21 To realize this
objective, Congress included section 404 in the CWA which was intended to help protect the nation's wetlands.2 2

Section 404 of the CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant
into the nation's waters without a permit; however, it does not regulate all of the activities that lead to wetlands loss. 23 Following considerable congressional debate regarding the proper agency to oversee the permit program, 4 a compromise was arranged so that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Corps share custody of
the program.25 It was decided that primary permitting authority
under section 404 would be administered by the Corps 26 with the
EPA maintaining statutory power to veto any permits erroneously
granted.27 The EPA was also required to produce, with the Corps,
21. Id. § 1251(a).
22. While Congress did not explicitly include wetlands under the jurisdiction of
section 404, the statute has been so interpreted by the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Army Corps of Engineers. See 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(g) (1989); 33 C.F.R. § 328
(1989). In 1985, the Supreme Court upheld these interpretations and encouraged a
broad reading of section 404. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121 (1985).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). Such pollutants include solid fill material such as
dredge spoil, or upland soil and debris. Id. § 1344(0(2). Activities that result in the loss
of most of the wetland acreage each year, such as draining and ditching of wetlands for
agricultural purposes, have "at times been interpreted by the Corps as not coming under
its regulatory purview." GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 32.
24. The measure presented by the House granted primary administrative authority
to the Corps, with the EPA having authority to designate critical areas where particular
pollutants would be prohibited. H.R. 11,896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 404 (1972), reprinted
in ENVTL. POL'Y Div., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-

MENTS OF 1972, at 1063-64 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

The House rationale was that because the Corps was already regulating construction and
fill activities in traditionally navigable waters and in the ocean under section 10 of the
River and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982), the final authority for permitting decisions should rest with the Corps. The Senate bill contained no separate dredge
and fill program, treating such activities the same as polluting activities and regulated in
the same way by the EPA. S. 2770, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 402 (1971), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 1685-92. Senator Muskie argued for EPA administration based on the dichotomous mission of the two agencies-the Corps' mission was to
protect navigation and easy access to the nation's waterways, while the EPA's mission
was to protect the environment. Kilgore, EPA's Evolving Role in Wetlands Proteclion:
Elaboration in Bersani v. United States EPA, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,479, 10,480 (1988). This unsure beginning with a mixed alliance of agencies holding
divergent wetlands interests has led to a permitting program that has been repeatedly
revised in response to court actions and indecisive administration.
25. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 24, at 324-25. This shared custody has
hampered the effectiveness of the section 404 program in realizing its goals. See OTA,
WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 167.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
27. EPA may veto any permit "whenever [the EPA administrator] determines...
that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse
affect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds, . . .fishery areas .... wildlife, or
recreational areas." Id. § 1344(c).
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specific guidelines for use in permit application decisions
and to help
28
in determining the extent of section 404 jurisdiction.
B.

Extent of 404 Jurisdiction-NavigableWaters

The section 404 program specifically regulates the dredging and

filling of materials in the navigable waters of the United States. 29
Two related questions arise when considering the definition of "navi-

gable waters": (1) What types of areas are included in the definition?; 30 and (2) Within an area that falls under 404 jurisdiction,

what is the landward extent of that jurisdiction? Originally, the
Corps adopted a narrow interpretation of 404 jurisdiction that included only selected navigable waters and very few wetland areas.3 1
However, following several court challenges, 32 the Corps was forced
to expand its interpretation to include all navigable waters, their adjacent wetlands, and many isolated wetlands. 3 After considerable
prodding from the EPA, the Corps finally revised its section 404 regulations to provide specifically for wetland protection. 4 Still, individ28. Id. § 1344(b)(1).
29. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(12). The Act defines "navigable waters" as the
"waters of the United States including the territorial seas," and does not emphasize the
term "navigable." Id. § 1362(7). This has been interpreted to mean that Congress intended all of the waters of the United States to be covered by the Act, whether they are
technically navigable or not. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 124 (1985).
30. For example, are wetland areas adjacent to oceans, streams and lakes considered navigable by the statute? If they are isolated from open water, are they still regulated by section 404?
3 1. This limited reading of navigable waters stems from the Corps' view of its role
in the CWA as protecting the quality of the water and de-emphasizes wetland values.
This interpretation runs counter to the reading of the CWA by the EPA and other federal resource agencies (such as the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service [hereinafter "resource agencies"]), frustrating their mission of environmental protection. OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 70.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d
897 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
33. See 33 C.F.R. § 328 (1989).
34. The revised regulations read in relevant part:
The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot rely on . . . artificial lines . . . but must focus on all waters that together form the entire
aquatic system. Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of this
part of the aquatic system, regardless of whether it is above or below an ordinary high water mark, or mean high tide line, will affect the water quality of
the other waters within that aquatic system.
For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction under Section 404
must include any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in reasona-

uals continue to challenge the types of wetlands covered under these
new regulations. 35
In 1985, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that including
wetlands within a broad definition of "navigable waters" is consistent with the legislative intent of the CWA. 36 The decision encourages a policy of considering marginal areas to be waters under section 404 jurisdiction. The impact of this decision on the scope of the
section 404 program is sufficiently addressed elsewhere.
Once it became established that most, if not all, wetlands fall
within section 404 jurisdiction, the next question became how to delineate the landward extent of a specific wetland area.38 The Corps
and the EPA had considerable difficulty agreeing on uniform methble proximity to other waters of the United States, as these wetlands are part
of this aquatic system.
42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977).
35. When challenged in court, artificial wetlands have usually been held to be
under Corps jurisdiction. See, e.g., Swanson v. United States, 789 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.
1986). In Bailey v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 44 (D. Idaho 1986), artificial wetlands
were held to be under section 404 jurisdiction even if they were not inundated, so long as
under normal circumstances the area had soils saturated enough to support wetlands
vegetation. Other cases have found that it is the present condition of the area and not the
manner in which the wetlands were created that is relevant to the jurisdictional issue.
See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 651 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Cal. 1987); Track 12, Inc. v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 618 F. Supp. 448 (D. Minn. 1985).
However, some of these challenges to section 404 jurisdiction have been successful. In
United States v. Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984), the court ruled that if an
action by the Corps inadvertently created the wetlands, then it is not under section 404
jurisdiction. The court postponed dealing with the question of intentionally created wetlands. In Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1988), the court
conducted a de novo wetlands determination and found that salt ponds were not under
the jurisdiction of the Corps because the ponds did not meet the definition of "wetlands."
The ponds were created by backflow onto the land without consent of the owner and
would normally be dry. The ability of the Corps to assert federal jurisdiction has also
been challenged. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher, 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex.
1987) (finding that if the wetlands are visited by migratory birds, then the interstate
commerce issue is sufficient for Corps jurisdiction).
36. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
There, the Supreme Court ruled that wetlands jurisdiction under section 404 includes
areas periodically inundated by the waters of the United States as well as areas saturated
by groundwater and adjacent to waters of the United States. The Court expressly left
open the question of whether wetlands saturated by groundwater, but not adjacent to
open water, are covered by section 404. See id. at 124.
37. See Note, The Clean Water Act-More Section 404: The Supreme Court Gets
Its Feet Wet, 65 B.U.L. REv. 995 (1985); Note, Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdiction
Over Wetlands Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 13 ECOLOGY L. Q. 579 (1986); Note, The Extent of Groundwater
JurisdictionUnder the Clean Water Act after Riverside Bayview Homes, 47 LA. L. REv.
859 (1987); Note, Environmental Law-The Sixth Circuit's UnsettlingInterpretationof
the Corps of Engineers' Wetlands Definition:United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984), 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 475 (1985).
38. The current definition of wetlands includes "those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support,
and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1988).
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ods to delineate the upper extent of a given wetland boundary.39 In
January 1989, the agencies finally signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) creating these uniform methods." This MOA is currently being incorporated into agency guidelines and has not yet
been implemented. Therefore, its utility in resolving the issue remains unknown.
C.

The Permit Process

The Corps' permit review process is designed to occur in sequential phases.4 1 First, upon receiving a permit application, the Corps
begins an initial review (or prepermit consultation) to suggest preliminary design changes and to determine if the project falls into 42a
general permit classification, or whether it is an individual project.

Second, the project is evaluated for compliance with the section
404(b)(1) Guidelines (Guidelines) .4 The Guidelines are intended to
be "binding" and "regulatory. 44 If the planned project does not
comply with them, the project must be modified or the permit must
39. The United States Attorney General concluded in 1979 that the EPA had the
ultimate authority to decide whether a planned project fell within the scope of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 15, at 5 (1979). However, the
way the permit program is set up, all applications are submitted to the Corps which then
decides whether a project is a special case that should be referred to EPA. This decision
depends, in part, on the wetlands jurisdiction issue. Therefore, while the EPA may officially have final authority in wetlands determinations, the definition used by the Corps is
much more crucial in practice.
40. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE AND U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. SOIL CONSERVATION SERV., FEDERAL
MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS: AN INTER-

(1989) [hereinafter FEDERAL MANUAL].
41. For an elaboration on recent findings regarding the permit review process, see
Liebesman, Clean Water Act's Section 404 Dredged and Fill Material DischargePermit
Program-SignificantIssues, at 4-9, in FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON WETLANDS
LAW AND REGULATION (A.B.A., May 11-12, 1989).
42. To make the section 404 program more manageable, the 1977 amendments to
the CWA authorized the issuance of general permits, which allow multiple activities similar in nature that will individually and cumulatively cause minimal environmental effects. The Corps may issue such permits on a state, regional or nationwide basis for
periods not exceeding five years. General permit activities are supposed to cumulatively
conform to the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines; however, review of cumulative impacts for
individual activities under general permits is rare. If the project falls under an existing
general permit, then the review process is usually bypassed-with the Corps treating it as
if the process had already been completed. If the application is for a new general permit,
then the review necessitates considerably more scrutiny than for an individual permit.
EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.7 (1989).
43. Id. § 230.
44. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,336 (1980).
AGENCY COOPERATIVE PUBLICATION

be denied. 45 The key provisions in the Guidelines focus on the availability of practicable alternatives to the project.4 6 The rules are quite
specific, stating that "no discharge of dredged or fill material shall
be permitted if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have a less adverse impact on the aquatic
ecosystem . . . ." The Guidelines also state that for projects that
are not water dependent,4 8 practicable alternatives are "presumed to
be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise. ' 49 This presumption is designed to be difficult to overcome. During the permit
review process, the Guidelines also require that cumulative impacts
analysis5" of individual projects be conducted on a given ecosystem.51
The Corps' district engineer determines the geographic areas in
which the cumulative impacts are considered. Within each of these
areas, a history of development and fill activities is compiled along
with anticipated future developments.
Third, once compliance with the Guidelines is confirmed, the permit must be certified to comply with state water quality standards,
as required under section 401.52 Finally, the public interest review
45. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1989).
46. The Guidelines state that "[a]n alternative is practicable if it is available and
capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes." See id. § 230.10(a)(2). This includes considering alternative sites that are not owned by the applicant. Id.
47. See id. § 230.10(a).
48. A project is water dependent if it "require[s] access or proximity to or siting
within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose." See id. §
230.10(a)(3). For example, a marina would be considered a water dependent project
while a shopping mall would not.
49. Id. § 230.10(a)(3). This section reads in part:
Restrictions on discharge.
(a)(3) Where the activity associated with a discharge which is proposed for a
special aquatic site (as defined by Subpart E) does not require access or proximity to or siting within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic
purpose (i.e., is not "water dependent"), practicable alternatives that do not
involve special aquatic sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise. In addition, where a discharge is proposed for a special
aquatic site, all practicable alternatives to the proposed discharge which do not
involve a discharge into a special aquatic site are presumed to have less adverse
impact on the aquatic ecosystem, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise.
Id.; see also Liebesman, supra note 41, at 6.

50. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(g)(1) (1989).
Cumulative impacts are changes that take place in aquatic ecosystems [including wetlands] that are attributable to the collective effect of a number of individual discharges of dredged or fill material. Although the impact of a particular discharge may constitute a minor change in itself, the cumulative effect of
numerous such piecemeal changes can result in a major impairment of the
water resources and interfere with the productivity and water quality of existing aquatic ecosystems.
Id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 28.

51. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(g)(2) (1989); GAO REPORT,
supra note 5, at 29 (citing the Corps' Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 84-9).
52. This certification may be affirmatively waived by the states. CWA § 401, 33
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process begins with a public notice acknowledging the permit appli-

cation and inviting comments from concerned individuals and resource agencies. 53 Comments from the United States Fish and Wild-

life Service are given particularly strong consideration. Fifteen to
thirty days after the public notice is issued, the Corps reviews public

comments and has the option to call a public hearing for further
input on the application.5 4 When damage to wetlands is involved, the
Corps must analyze alternatives to the project from a public interest
context and provide a benefits analysis on the alternatives. 55 The

Corps is then required to search for the "least harmful -alternative
that is feasible. ' 56 When the project imposes an unavoidable impact
on the wetland area and there is no practicable alternative, the applicant must attempt to compensate for the damage through
mitigation.
D. Enforcement

Enforcement of section 404 regulations is shared by the EPA and
the Corps.5 7 However, there is considerable latitude in the way the
U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1982); see 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(b) (1989) (certification procedures).
The First Circuit recently affirmed the need for individual water quality certifications
for all projects, including those falling under general permits. See United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1989).
53. The purpose of this phase is.to determine if the project is in the public's interest. Public notices of the application are issued within 15 days of receipt of the completed
application by the Corps. Corps regulations require that the notices supply "information
sufficient to give a clear understanding of the proposed activity in order to generate
meaningful comments." GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
54. The public at large may also request a public hearing, but the district engineer
for the Corps does not have to grant the request. 33 C.F.R. § 327.4(b) (1989).
In the public interest review, the Corps considers and balances impacts on conservation, economics, aesthetics, the general environment, historic values, fish and wildlife,
flood damage prevention, water supply, water quality, energy and other concerns. See id.
§ 320.4(a)(1). Permit decisions must be made with all of these factors in mind. See Mall
Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1987), appealdismissed, 841 F.2d
440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 128 (1988). The Corps must also give full consideration to comments from the resource agencies (United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)) regarding the impacts on
wildlife resources. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(2)(3) (1989).
55. Specifically, the Corps must "determine if the benefits of the alternative outweigh the damage to the wetlands resources, whether the activity is 'water dependent,'
whether it can be shown that there are no feasible alternatives and the extent of public
vs. private benefit for the project." Liebesman, supra note 41, at 5; see also 33 C.F.R. §
320.4 (1989).
56. North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 446 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
57. The Corps has enforcement power over unpermitted discharges and the failure
to comply with permit conditions. The EPA is empowered to independently enforce
against unauthorized, unpermitted filling activities and violations of state-run, section

agencies may use their enforcement powers. Both agencies have authority to administer surveillance programs to monitor unpermitted
activities and violations of permit conditions."6 When violations are
found, the agencies may issue cease and desist orders, order restoration of the project site, or pursue civil penalties and occasionally,
criminal prosecution. 59 The Corps may also opt to enter into negotiations with the violator, arranging modifications to the project to
bring it into compliance.
In addition to these enforcement capabilities, the EPA has the capacity to veto any permit decision made by the Corps.60 The provision for this power is derived from the original CWA congressional
debates regarding whether the EPA or the Corps should administer
the section 404 permit process. 6 The veto capability has been re-

potenpeatedly challenged and affirmed in the courts.62 Despite the
63
tial utility of the EPA veto authority, it is used sparingly.

404 regulatory systems. CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982).
58. However, neither agency is currently using this authority extensively. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 55-65.
59. The CVA authorizes penalties of up to $25,000 per day of violation and one
year imprisonment for any person that willfully or negligently violates a permit condition
or limitation. Repeat offenders may receive a fine of up to $50,000 per day of violation, a
prison term of up to two years or both. Id. at 65.
60. The EPA veto authority provision, § 404(c) of the CWA, provides:
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including the
withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and he is
authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of
such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and
breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before making such a determination, the Administrator shall consult with the [Corps]. The [EPA] shall set
forth in writing and make public [its] findings and [its] reasons for making this
determination under this subsection.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1982).
61. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 24, at 177.
62. The EPA's veto of a section 404 permit is reviewable by a court, but the EPA's
decision to initiate a veto proceeding is not, because it is not a final agency decision.
Newport Galleria Group v. Deland, 618 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (D.D.C. 1985). The Second
Circuit held that noncompliance with section 404(b)(1) Guidelines was sufficient cause
for a permit veto. Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1556 (1989). Congressional authorization for a project does not override the
EPA's veto authority. Creppel v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 19 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,134, 20,137 (E.D. La. 1988).
63. The EPA veto authority has been used only seven times through 1988. The
sites involved in these veto decisions are: (1) North Miami Landfill (1981); (2) M.A.
Norden Site, Mobile Alabama (June 15, 1984); (3) Jack Maybank Site, Jehosse Island,
South Carolina (April 5, 1985); (4) Sweedens Swamp Site, Attleboro, Massachusetts
(May 13, 1986); (5) Bayou Aux Carpes Site, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana (October 16,
1985); (6) Russo Development Corp. Site, Carlsbad, New Jersey (May 9, 1988); and (7)
Lake Alma Project, Georgia (Feb. 14, 1989). Liebesman, supra note 41, at 9.
In the Russo Development Corp. case, the EPA vetoed a Corps after-the-fact permit
for the first time. Russo Dev. Corp., 53 Fed. Reg. 16,469 (E.P.A. 1988). This veto is
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The Water Quality Act of 1987 has increased the enforcement

capabilities and flexibility of section 404 authorizing the EPA and
the Corps to issue administrative orders directly imposing penalties,

requiring corrective action, or both.64 In addition, the 1987 Act increased the extent of each of these remedies and the minimum fines

imposed for violations.6 5

E.

Citizen Suits

In the event that an unpermitted project should slip past these
agencies (or if the permit process, for one reason or another, has
been compromised), Congress provided the ability for private citizens to become their own attorneys general.6 6 Citizens may sue the
violating party and either the Corps or the EPA to compel enforcement of the CWA's provisions.6 7 However, the CWA places several
restrictions on the availability of these suits. For example, citizens
may sue only for violations of section 404 standards or for the failure
currently being challenged in court. See Russo Dev. Corp. v. Thomas, No. 87-3916
(D.N.J. Nov. 6, 1989).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988). The agencies no longer must institute complicated
and time consuming civil proceedings to compel compliance. This improvement should
significantly enhance the efficiency of enforcement. The authority has already been used
by the EPA on at least 18 occasions; the Corps has made no plans to implement the new
enforcement powers. See Liebesman, supra note 41, at 17.
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), (d) (1988).
66. By including the citizen suit provision in the CWA, Congress expected citizens
to supplement the enforcement capabilities of the government. For a brief discussion on
the pros and cons of citizen suits in environmental legislation, see Garrett, Citizen Suits:
A Defense Perspective, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,162 (1986), and Roisman,
The Role of the Citizen in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,163 (1986).
67. Section 505(a) of the CWA, reads in part:
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section . . . any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).
While the statute names only "the [EPA] Administrator," the Corps may also be sued
under this section. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir.
1988). Federal facilities that have violated the CWA regulations may also be sued pursuant to section 505(a)(1).

of the Corps or the EPA to perform a nondiscretionary duty.' 8 Also,
citizens must give sixty days notice prior to filing suit,69 and may not
file suit if an enforcement action is being diligently prosecuted by the
Corps or the EPA. 70 The notice period allows the agencies to review
the administrative record (if there is one) and to modify the permit
or take an enforcement action against the violator.
Remedies for citizens' suits are generally confined to injunctive relief. However, prevailing parties are allowed to recover attorneys'
fees and expert witness costs. 1 Courts have balked at ordering recovery of these expenses from private parties, often noting that the
permit applicant made an honest effort to comply with section 404
regulations as explained to them by Corps officials.72 In cases where
violators lack these good intentions, courts are less hesitant to award
attorneys' fees.73 This provision allows citizens to pursue responsible
legal action with quality representation without incurring a large financial loss. Unfortunately, attorneys' fees are not awarded until after a final decision is rendered, which in environmental suits may
take several years.
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).
69. Section 505(b) of the CWA, reads in part:
(b) Notice
No action may be commenced(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged
violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a
State to require compliance with the standard limitation, or order, but
in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may
intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator[.]
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1988).
71. Section 505(d) of the CWA, reads in part:
(d) Litigation costs
The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this
section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.
33 U.S.C. §1363(d) (1988); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 316-17
(4th Cir. 1988).
72. See Hanson, 859 F.2d at 319. "[lIt may be proper to treat private parties
differently than governmental entities, for 'special care [should be exercised] regarding
the award of fees against private parties.'" Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 786
F.2d 631, 634 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680,
692 n.12 (1983)).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610 (D.C. Va. 1983), aff d, 769
F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (The court
awarding attorneys' fees to the government).
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III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Problems

As seen from the above discussion, the section 404 permitting program is extensive, but it is designed to be easily implemented. In the
absence of all-encompassing federal legislation governing the use of
wetlands, section 404 is the primary regulatory program controlling
wetland destruction and preservation.7 4 However, the section 404
program has not been administered as it was intended.
Independent assessments have severely criticized the section 404
program for failing to protect wetlands. For example, the Office of
Technology Assessment, using Corps information from 1980 and
1981, estimated that the acreage protected in those years was less
than 50,000 acres. 5 This figure amounts to less than fifteen percent
of the total wetland acreage lost each year. 6 One reason for this
criticism, and perhaps the primary limitation of the section 404 program, is that it regulates only filling and dredging activities." Nevertheless, there are substantial wetland areas and development activities covered by section 404 and Corps regulations. But enforcement
of these regulations is largely ineffective, and the Corps' administration of the section 404 program has been characterized as lacklus74. While there has been considerable litigation challenging and clarifying the section's language, section 404 remains a conceptually powerful tool to prevent wetland loss.
The Supreme Court recently emphasized that "in defining the waters covered by the Act
to include wetlands, the Corps is 'implementing congressional policy rather than embarking on a frolic of its own.'" United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 139 (1985) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 375

(1969)).

75. It did not specify how much less. OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note
12, at 3-4.
76. See id. at 11. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 5 (Critically examining
the administration of the permit program by the Corps and disapproving of it). The
section 404 program was labeled a "dismal failure" in protecting wetlands by the National Wildlife Federation. NWF, STATUS REPORT, supra note 8, at 37.
77. Activities that result in the loss of most of the wetland acreage each year, such
as draining or clearcutting of vegetation for agricultural purposes, are not covered by the
section 404 program. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 19. However, subsidies still exist
for farmers that drain wetlands. OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 12.
Even within those areas covered by section 404, there are categorical exemptions from
jurisdiction for normal agriculture and ranching operations. The definition of those activities may vary widely, and these activities have been the cause of much of the wetlands
lost. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 19. The GAO apparently believes that these definitions have been broadly construed by the Corps. A narrow interpretation of these exemptions, which has been contrary to Corps policy, would undoubtedly help reduce the
amount of wetlands lost.

ter.7 This lack of enthusiasm in enforcement pervades the program
and was candidly criticized in a recent General Accounting Office
(GAO) review of the Corps' handling of the section 404 program. 7 9
This congressionally requested review verified the EPA and Fish and
Wildlife Service concerns over the continued loss of wetlands under
the program.
These concerns present the other side of the section 404 paradox-the law is on the books and the congressional intent and popular sentiment to protect wetlands exist, but the law is easily circumvented and often unenforced. The EPA and the Corps are unable to
agree on a uniform interpretation of the regulations and guidance
written into section 404. The reasons for this are many and varied.
However, they likely stem from two very different interpretations of
the purpose of the section 404 program. On the one hand, the Corps
has stated that the emphasis of section 404 is to protect the waters of
the United States, and that it was not designed as a wetland protection program. 0 The Corps sees its main goal as processing permits.
Consequently, the Corps has adopted a narrow definition of nearly
all of the pivotal terms in the Act. On the other hand, the EPA has
read the Act as a mandate to protect wetlands to the fullest extent.
To this end, it has construed the terms of section 404 broadly.81 The
following analysis reviews some of the more obvious failures of the
section 404 program, most of which are attributable to the Army
Corps of Engineers.
1. Insufficient Assertion of Wetland Jurisdiction
As mentioned earlier, the Corps and the EPA have had considerable difficulty agreeing on methods for delineating the landward extent of a given wetland. 2 While the uniform methods agreed to in
78. See NWF, STATUS REPORT, supra note 8, at 36.
79. The GAO noted that not only is the section 404 program failing to control
most of the wetland losses, reliable records are not being kept regarding the extent to
which it has been effective. "[N]o definitive data are available to measure with precision
the impact of the section 404 regulatory program in terms of wetlands acreage protected
or lost. Moreover, permit documents do not always include the information necessary to
begin compiling such data." GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 20. In fact, random samples
of permit applications indicated that "permits often do not record the amount of wetlands to be affected by the proposed activity." Id. If the amount of acreage affected is
not recorded, the Corps automatically loses its enforcement leverage, because wetland
loss due to noncompliance cannot be proven. The lack of this very basic information
would seem to make the permit review process futile, and render monitoring of permit
conditions impossible.
80. See NWF, STATUS REPORT, supra note 8, at 36; OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 167.
81. See Kilgore, supra note 24, at 10,480.
82. See Liebesman, supra note 41, at 1-4. When the Corps and the EPA (and the
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)) use different techniques to delineate wetland boundaries, the final acreage estimates can vary by thousands of acres. For example, the GAO
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January 198983 may eventually help solve the problem, these methods have yet to be implemented and their effect is relatively un-

known. Meanwhile, many wetlands currently under review have uncertain boundaries, and large areas of wetlands are continually being

lost due to inconsistent delineation procedures. In addition, the new
uniform methods have been criticizeda4because they fail to consider

regional differences in wetland types.

2. Disregardfor the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines
The Corps and the EPA view the section 404 application process
differently, resulting in the use of different criteria to evaluate poten-

tial projects. While the CWA states that use of the Guidelines in
permit review is nondiscretionary,85 it fails to provide a mandatory
outline for their application. The EPA viewpoint tracks the plain
report noted that records from the Vicksburg office of the Corps estimated the program
allowed the loss of 800 acres in that region in 1986. The FWS office for the same region
estimated that about 55,000 acres were adversely impacted by the program over the
same period. In one 1985 project, the Corps received a permit application to fill 1300
acres of wetland (as estimated by FWS) for agriculture. The Corps decided that only 80
acres of wetland existed on the site, and approved the permit over a recommendation by
the FWS to deny it. The 1220 acres that fell out of the Corps jurisdictional limits were
subsequently filled and developed. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 24-25.

83.

FEDERAL MANUAL,

supra note 40.

84. This criticism has been raised in scientific circles because the criteria used in
the new Memorandum of Agreement may greatly underestimate wetland acreage in arid
areas such as the southwest. In these areas, the long-term hydrologic cycles may indicate
that an area should be considered as wetlands. However, prolonged dry periods may
make that area appear to lack a dominant hydrology for short periods of time. These
short-term anomalies are not considered in the new method; rather, it considers the immediate condition of the project site. As a result, the timing of the project, not the physical characteristics of the site, may determine whether an area is allowed to be filled
because of a lack of hydrology. Interview with Sharon Lockhart, Associate of the Pacific
Estuarine Research Laboratory, in San Diego (July 29, 1989).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1988). This section provides in part:
(b) Specification for disposal sites
Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each such disposal site shall be
specified for each such permit by the Secretary of the Army (1) through the
application of guidelines developed by the Administrator [of the EPA], in
conjunction with the Secretary[.]
Id. (emphasis added).
However, there have been several cases where the Guidelines have been challenged in
court with conflicting results. In Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1180 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983), and Shoreline Assocs. v. Marsh, 555 F. Supp.
169 (D. Md. 1983), afj'd, 725 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1984), the courts found that the Corps
must use the Guidelines. But in 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D.
Va. 1983) and National Audubon Soc'y v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 14 ENVTL L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,724 (D.N.J. 1983), the courts minimized the importance of the
Guidelines.

language of the CWA, which states that the process is intended to
be sequential. 86 The first step is to examine whether the project complies with the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.8 If the project fails this
threshold test, the process stops here, before the public review process and the permit is denied. Only if the project complies with the
Guidelines does it move forward to the public review phase to see if
it is in the public's interest. 88 Therefore, permit denial may occur on
strict environmental grounds, regardless of economic concerns.89
The Corps, on the other hand, does not consider satisfaction of the
86. For the EPA viewpoint, see Ciupek, Protecting Wetlands Under Clean Water
Act § 404: EPA's Conservative Policy on Mitigation, 8 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 12
(1986). The CWA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, promulgated by the EPA provide:
§ 230.5 General procedures to be followed.
In evaluating whether a particular discharge site may be specified, the permitting authority should use these Guidelines in the following sequence:
(a) In order to obtain an overview of the principal regulatory provisions of
the Guidelines, review the restrictions on discharge in § 230.10(a) through (d),
the measures to minimize adverse impact of Subpart H, and the required factual determinations of § 230.11.
(b) Determine if a General permit (§ 230.7) is applicable; if so, the applicant needs merely to comply with its terms, and no further action by the permitting authority is necessary ....
If the discharge is not covered by a General permit:
(c) Examine practicable alternatives to the proposed discharge, that is, not
discharging into the waters of the U.S. or discharging into an alternative
aquatic site with potentially less damaging consequences (§ 230.10(a)).
(d) Delineate the candidate disposal the site consistent with the criteria and
evaluations of § 230.11(f).
(e) Evaluate the various physical and chemical components which characterize the non-living environment of the candidate site, the substrate and the
water including its dynamic characteristics (Subpart C).
(f) Identify and evaluate any special or critical characteristics of the candidate disposal site, and surrounding areas which might be affected by use of
such site, related to their living communities or human uses (Subparts D, E,
and F).
(g) Review Factual Determinations in § 230.11 to determine whether the
information in the project file is sufficient to provide the documentation required by § 230.11 or to perform the pre-testing evaluation described in §
230.60, or other information is necessary.
(h) Evaluate the material to be discharged to determine the possibility of
chemical contamination or physical incompatibility of the material to be discharged (§ 230.60).
(i) If there is a reasonable probability of chemical contaimination, conduct
the appropriate tests. ...
(j) Identify appropriate and practicable changes to the project plan to minimize the environmental impact of the discharge, based upon the specialized
methods of minimization of impacts in Subpart H.
(k) Make and document Factual Determinations in § 230.11.
(1) Make and document Findings of Compliance § 230.12 by comparing
Factual Determinations with the requirements for discharge of § 230.10.
40 C.F.R. § 230.5 (1989).
87. Ciupek, supra note 86, at 12. This does not include prepermit consultations.
88. Economic and social concerns are first addressed at the public review phase.
89. See Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1556 (1989).
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Guidelines a prerequisite to the public review process. Instead, it sees
the Guidelines as merely advisory, providing a checklist of what to
look for in simultaneously balancing environmental effects with "the
public interest" during the public interest review. 90 However, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has confirmed that use of the
Guidelines in evaluating a permit is mandatory, and that the Corps
may not issue a permit if it violates those guidelines, even if the
Corps' public interest review weighs in favor of the project. 9' Further, the court ruled that the public interest review, which lacks specific standards for evaluation, is not mandatory under section 404.92
This decision is contrary to several earlier decisions addressing the
issue,93 and it remains to be seen whether it will be controlling.
3. Inadequate Considerationof Practicable
Alternatives

Many of the disputes between the Corps and the EPA regarding
the Guidelines concern the analysis of practicable alternatives.94 In
particular, these disputes involve the extent to which a given project
is water dependent. 5 There is a stated presumption in the Guidelines
that there are less damaging, more practicable alternatives to a pro-

ject if it is not water dependent.9

6

To fill a wetland area for a non-

water-dependent project, the applicant must successfully refute this
presumption. The Corps has chosen to rely on the permit applicants
to determine if there are practicable alternatives to the project and
to define the "purpose of the project," which is used to make that
determination.9" As a result, few permits are denied on the basis of
the practicable alternatives test because applicants can define their
project goals narrowly enough to make the proposed project site the
90.

Barrows, Mitigation in the Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Program, 8

NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 11 (1986).

91. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 39-40.
92. Id. at 40; see also Kilgore, supra note 24, at 10,482.
93. See, e.g., 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983);
National Audubon Soc'y v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,724 (D.N.J. 1983).
94. The section 404(b)(1) Guidelines prohibit the discharge of fill or dredge spoil
into wetlands if there are less environmentally damaging, practicable alternatives to the
project available. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1989).
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service has been at odds with the Corps over this
issue. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 25-28.
95. "Water dependent" is defined supra note 48.
96. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (1989). For text of the
regulation, see supra note 49.
97. GAO REPoRT, supra note 5, at 26.

only possible location. 98
The EPA, on the other hand, defines the purpose of a project

broadly, 98 which allows for a wider spectrum of project alternatives.
An applicant that wants his or her project approved by the EPA
would define the same project even more narrowly.""0 In Bersani v.
Robichaud,' the Second Circuit ruled that the EPA was justified in
using its broad interpretation of alternatives. The court also found
that the applicant must consider whatever alternatives were available

at the time the applicant entered the market for that development
10 2
project, as opposed to the time of application for the permit.
Another major problem with the alternatives analysis is that the
EPA and the Corps disagree on the extent to which practicable alternatives are considered in permit issuance. 10 3 The EPA emphasizes
environmental concerns regarding practicable alternatives, regardless
of whether they are more costly to the applicants. The Corps, however, considers an alternative practicable only if the applicant
does. 0 4 In commenting on the GAO report, the Department of Defense stated that "it is not reasonable to take a stance that would
result in a denial of all non-water-dependent section 404 applications
on the basis of the lack of proof that no practicable alternatives exist. 11' 0 Whether the Corps thinks this is reasonable or not, this is
exactly what the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines mandate. 06
4. Failure to Account for Cumulative Impacts
Both the Corps and resource agencies agree that cumulative impact studies are not adequately addressed in the permitting process.
Logistical reasons are usually given for not considering cumulative
98. Id. at 27. The EPA commented on this problem in 1987, stating that "for the
majority of the cases we have seen, the Corps practice is to issue permits for whatever
the applicant wants with very little consideration given to the 'tests' within the Guidelines that address prohibition and alternatives, or EPA stated concerns." GAO REPORT,
supra note 5, at 27 (quoting a memo to the EPA Office of Wetlands Protection from
EPA region VI staff (May 26, 1987)).
99. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 27. For example, a project would be referred
to generically as a shopping center (not water dependent) or a marina (water dependent).
100. For example, an applicant would describe his or her shopping center as a
nautical theme shopping center with a water front boardwalk and restaurants with a bay
view. It would be much more difficult to find an alternative site for such a project using
this description of the project's purpose.
101. 850 F.2d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1556 (1989).
102. "In short, we conclude that a common sense reading of the statute can only
lead to the use of the market entry approach [to practicable alternatives analysis] used
by the EPA." Id. at 44.
103.

GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.

104. Id.
105.

Id. at 28.

106. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (1989). For text of
the regulation, see supra note 49.

[VOL. 27: 139, 1990]

Wetland Protection
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

impacts; it is easier to consider the permit applications individually.1" 7 Part of this logistical problem stems from poor record keeping by the Corps. Total acreage affected is incalculable because
many permits lack specific figures on wetland loss. 10 8
Although Corps regulations require cumulative impacts evaluation
in all permits,109 resource agencies' concerns over cumulative impacts, known to the Corps, often are not heeded."10 For example,
when the Laguna Niguel, California office of the Fish and Wildlife
Service wrote the Corps' district engineer asking for consideration of
cumulative impacts in permit decisions, the Corps responded that it
did not have the resources to worry about such impacts."' Resource
agencies appear particularly concerned with projects that are authorized by nationwide (or general) permits because, once granted, the
resource agencies lose their opportunity to comment on individual
projects." 2
In commenting on the findings of the GAO, the Department of
Defense agreed that it is difficult to assess cumulative impacts, but
that "[t]he Corps must not adopt a narrow view that all wetlands
must be equally protected without consideration. . .of public and
private needs. No exact methodology exists concerning cumulative
impacts assessment . . ...
"I The GAO reported that with no offi107. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 28.
108. Id. at 20.
109. "The decision whether to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the
probable impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended
use on the public interest." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1989).
110. The GAO reported an instance where the EPA recommended denial of a permit to fill 12 acres of bottomland hardwood wetland because the area had been impacted
by earlier agricultural activities and the bottomland hardwoods were regionally depleted.
The EPA pointed out that the further loss of the functional values of these areas would
adversely effect the overall system. The Corps acknowledged that there would be a reduction in functional values, but felt the impact would not be significant. GAO REPORT,
supra note 5, at 29.
111. "Unfortunately, I cannot recommend discretionary action without objective
data on the degree of cumulative impacts occurring and we lack the resources necessary
to collect and compile such data." Letter from Tadahiko Ono, Los Angeles District Engineer, USFWS, to Nancy Kaufman, Field Supervisor, USFWS (February 27, 1989).
112.

GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 30. Once a nationwide permit is granted,

individual projects are not required to go through section 404(b)(1) and practicable alternatives analyses. 33 C.F.R. § 330.8 (1989). However, district engineers have the authority to revoke nationwide permit status and require individual project analysis if they
have concerns regarding the environmental soundness of a project. Nevertheless, the resource agency offices that were reviewed by GAO provide specific instances of the Corps
systematically ignoring their comments regarding cumulative environmental impacts. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 30-32.
113. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 86 (comments from the Department of

Defense).

cial method available for estimating cumulative impacts, and because of fundamental differences between the Corps and resource
agencies regarding how and when assessment is made, the issue ap-

pears deadlocked.114 The result is a continued loss of wetlands until
the issue is decided by the agencies or the courts, or is addressed by
Congress through amendments to the CWA.
5. Improper Use of Mitigation
Ideally, the destruction of wetlands is a last resort and an undesirable conclusion to the section 404 permit process. All options to
avoid or minimize impacts should be exhausted before the permit is
granted. 11 5 When impacts are unavoidable (for example, wetlands
are filled) for a given project, the permittee is required to mitigate
the loss of the wetlands through compensation techniques, such as
wetland creation or restoration in some nearby area."16 The mitigation requirement, however, has become a double-edged sword.
Instead of using compensatory mitigation as a last resort, the
Corps often grants permits that fail to comply with the Guidelines,
allowing the permittee to mitigate for wetland loss in another
area. 117 By considering the compensatory alternative throughout all
phases of permit review, the Corps is conceding the loss of wetlands,
so long as the applicant mitigates the loss. Such a philosophy reduces
the incentive for permit applicants to minimize impacts at the proposed project site. In addition, compensatory mitigation efforts often
produce wetland types that are not the same as those lost."18 Even
when the correct wetland type is created, there is no assurance that
114. See id. at 33. Since the GAO report was released, the Corps and EPA have
tentatively agreed on general methods to estimate cumulative impacts; however, these
methods have not been adopted by either agency. For the methods, see Gosselink & Lee,
Cumulative Impact Assessment in Bottomland Hardwood Forests, 9 WETLANDS 1
(1989).
115. Once the practicable alternatives analysis is completed and there is found to
be no practicable alternative to the project, environmental impacts are to be minimized
by modifying the project to include buffer zones, timed discharges, and restoration of the
affected area. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.10(d), 230.72 (1989).
116. This type of mitigation is referred to as "compensatory mitigation." See Ciupek, supra note 86, at 12.
117. The EPA has emphasized that compensatory mitigation is not to be considered "a remedy for destroying wetlands when a practicable alternative exists." Id. at 13
(address by Jennifer Joy Wilson, EPA Assistant Administrator for External Affairs, at
Senate oversight hearing held by the Environmental Pollution Subcommittee on Environment and Public Works (July 31, 1986)).
118. See OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 129. The temporal loss
of wetlands in the interim between the development and the functional completion of the
wetland mitigation is another issue that is only now being addressed. The importance of
the issue is underscored by the fact that many endangered species and migratory
waterbirds are reliant on wetlands at particular times of the year. See 1 WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE (J. Kusler & M. Kentula eds.

1989) [hereinafter

WETLAND CREATION].
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the wetland constructed or restored is able to replace the functional
values of the wetlands lost." 9 In other words, the Corps is forfeiting
functional wetland habitat in exchange for an unknown commodity.
6. Failure to Abide by Resource Agency Recommendations
Before receiving a permit application, the Corps usually receives a
consultation request from the potential applicant. 120 The consultation
is shared with the various resource agencies, which assess the project
and discuss any less damaging alternatives.' 2' The resource agencies
22
generally agree that these consultations are valuable when used.
However, the frequency with which the Corps actually includes the
agencies in these consultations varies between districts, and there is
no department-wide policy on their use. 23 Where pre-application
meetings do occur, the agencies' complaints include lack of control
over the agenda, infrequency of meetings, and a recent decrease in
emphasis on agency involvement.' 2 4
Following the pre-application consultation (if there is one), the
Corps releases a public notice of the permit application to solicit
comments from resource agencies and the public at large.' 25 The information on which the agencies must rely for their comments is
contained in these notices. 28 The accuracy of this information is
often questionable, and problems include illegible information, incorrect project locations, and incomplete descriptions of project
scope. 127 One reason for notice inaccuracies is that the Corps often
uses unverified information supplied by the applicant. 12 8
119. See OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 129.
120. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 37-39.
121. Id. at 37.
122. Id. Permit processing is faster, permit denials are fewer, and the impact on
the resource is reduced by getting the resource agencies involved earlier in the process.
Id. at 39.

123. Id.
124. Id. at 38-39. Since the 1982 Corps regulatory reform, an increased emphasis
on permit issuance and decreased emphasis on agency involvement has been noted in the
Jacksonville District in particular. Id. at 38.
125. Id.at 40.
126. Id.
127. Id. Clarifications are often requested by the resource agencies (EPA, Fish and
Wildlife Service, and National Marine Fisheries Service). The EPA estimates that resources are spent to clarify information on about *one-half of the public notices that it
receives. Id.
128. Id. The text of the public notices often comes directly from the permit applicant without verification by the Corps. Id. Because of a limitation on agency resources,
the staff is usually unable to visit the sites and verify the information. Some districts
include a note on the public notice that the information is unverified so the reviewer will

The resource agencies also provide input during the public review
process. 12 9 The agencies often feel that the Corps pays little attention to their comments, particularly with respect to recommendations

for denial of permits. 130 For example, some districts do not inform
the agencies on how their recommendations are used'-" while others

fail to document how recommendations are incorporated even for
their own records. 32 As a result, feedback is difficult to obtain. The
resource agencies may appeal a permit issued over their recommendations by requesting an "elevation.' 3 3 However, elevation appeals
are rare because the agencies believe that the process is both time
consuming and futile.134 Other recommendations, such as project
modifications or permits issued under special conditions, are generally met more favorably.' 35 In some districts, recommendations have
been accepted 3when
they involve the agency's area of expertise, but
6
not otherwise.'
137
When direct conflicts arise, the elevation power is rarely used.
Instead of elevating a decision when they feel that a permit should
be denied, the agencies often choose to negotiate a compromise with
the Corps or the applicant, arranging a modification of the permit. 138
The result is partial development of the wetland area, and further
wetland acreage is lost in small sections. Each of these losses is too
insignificant for the agencies to pursue individually, but together
know that it may require additional scrutiny. Id.
129. Id. at 41. Resource agencies either do not object or do not comment on a
majority of permit applications. The reason usually given is lack of sufficient resources
for complete review of all applications. In these cases, the agencies often make an inhouse evaluation of the project and conclude that it is not likely to have a major environmental impact. Id. However, such evaluations do not become part of the Corps record on
the project because they remain in-house; as such, they are unavailable to the Corps for
possible cumulative impact assessment.
130. After reviewing over 1400 permit applications, the GAO estimated that the
Corps issued permits over denial recommendations 37% of the time. Id. Most of these
denial recommendations stem from a violation of the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, such
as non-water-dependency, inadequate mitigation, practicable alternatives, and so on. Id.
at 42. Other recommendations were accepted from 58 to 100% of the time, depending on
the district office. Id. at 37. For specific examples see id. at 43-44.
131. Id. at 42.
132. Id. at 44. As a result, neither the Corps nor the resource agencies have verifiable data on how often the recommendations are used. Id.
133. Id. at 42. An "elevation" is a review of the permit administrative record,
granted at the discretion of the Corps, above the district engineer level. Id. at 48. See
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Army (January 1987) [hereinafter 1987 MOA]; Kilgore, supra note 24,
at 10,485.
134. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 43.
135. Id. at 46.
136. Id. at 46-47.
137. Id. at 48.
138. Id. Because the process is resource-intensive, the agencies only elevate those
decisions that are of extreme importance and "have the best chance for reversal." Id. at
49.
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they have a significant impact on the nation's resource.
7.

Lack of Active Monitoring Programs

The Corps district engineers are authorized to conduct regular
surveillance to detect unpermitted activities and violations of permit
conditions in their regions.13 9 This authorization is de-emphasized in
most Corps offices, with no systematic methods of surveillance in use
in 1989.140 While acknowledging that unauthorized activities may go
undetected without surveillance programs, the Corps chooses instead
to channel its resources into permit processing. 41 The Corps also
claims that monitoring and enforcement of unpermitted activities not
in violation of permit conditions is the job of the EPA.142 However,

none of the resource agencies have routine surveillance programs,
and they generally report unauthorized activities only through casual

observations. 48

After a permit is granted, the Corps district offices have discre-

tionary power to inspect sites for compliance with permit conditions. 44 However, in a sample of 197 permits issued from five Corps
districts, post-permit visits occurred in just twenty-eight percent of
the projects. 145 This lack of permit follow-up is attributed to a lack
of enforcement resources in the district offices.' 46
While the Corps and the EPA may not actively search for violations, unauthorized activities and violations of permit conditions are
often brought to attention by outside sources.

47

However, investiga-

139. Id. at 55. Corps regulations also encourage district offices to involve their
staff, other federal and state employees, and the public in reporting unpermitted fill. Id.
at 56.
140. Id. at 55. However, there are some state agencies that assume this surveillance role. Id. at 55-56. Aerial surveys are a potentially powerful and economical tool for
surveillance programs. However, budget cuts in the mid-1980s have resulted in a phasing
out of the aerial program. Id. at 57-58.
141. Id. at 55. Budgetary concerns are one reason given for this low priority of
enforcement. Id. One district chief rationalizes the district's passive policy on surveillance by noting that if the Corps actively searched for violations, it would have "many
more cases of unpermitted fills than they would be able to handle." Id. at 56.
142. Id. at 55. The Department of Defense claims that the Corps is only empowered to enforce against violations of permit conditions and does not have the power to
enforce against unpermitted activities. Id. at 57.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 62.
145. Id. Of the five districts surveyed, one district visited only one of 32 permit
sites and another failed to visit any of the 40 project sites permitted. Id.
146. Id. at 55.
147. For example, local agencies and individuals are often the source of reported
violations. Id. at 56.

tions of these violations are normally delayed for weeks or months,
or in some cases not done at all.148 Such delays lead to undocumented wetland loss and hamper investigation and enforcement
efforts.1 49
8. Unclear Whether Enforcement is Mandatory
One area of great judicial uncertainty is whether enforcement of
section 404 by the EPA and the Corps is mandatory or discretionary.
This issue is crucial in light of the availability of citizens suits under
section 505, which allows such suits against EPA and the Corps only
when the agency has failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty under
section 404.15° The plain language of section 404151 indicates enforcement was meant to be mandatory.151 However, courts have not
definitely interpreted this language.
In the 1977 case of Sierra Club v. Train,15 3 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals felt it necessary to use extrinsic evidence to deter148. In some cases, active violations were not investigated by the Corps for over six
months after being reported. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
149. With the Corps' relaxed methods for following up on reported violations, the
likelihood of estoppel claims as a defense to belated enforcement becomes a definite possibility. Already, one permit violator has attempted to use such a claim to avoid civil
penalties for unauthorized filling activities. In United States v. Boccanfuso, 695 F. Supp.
693 (D. Conn. 1988), rev'd, 882 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1989), the Corps misstated its jurisdictional limits to the applicant, saying it only extended to the mean high water mark.
The Corps then failed to respond to the permit application within six months, misleading
the applicant into believing no permit would be needed. The district court ruled that the
Corps was estopped from asserting its jurisdiction over the fill site because it had affirmatively misled the applicant into believing that his project was outside Corps jurisdiction,
Id. at 698-99. The Second Circuit later reversed, finding that estoppel claims against the
government must be used only in limited circumstances. Buccanfuso, 882 F.2d 666. The
court found that other communications with the Corps should have put Boccanfuso on
notice of his permitting obligations; therefore, he could not have reasonably relied upon a
single misstatement. Id. at 670-71. The court affirmed that estoppel against the government is a possible, albeit limited, ground for avoiding the enforcement authority. Id. at
670.
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982); see supra note 67.
151. Section 404(s)(1) reads:
(s) Violation of permits
(1) Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Secretary
finds that any person is in violation of any condition or limitation set forth in a
permit issued by the Secretary under this section, the Secretary shall issue an
order requiring such person to comply with such condition or limitation, or the
Secretary shall bring a civil action in accordance with paragraph (3) of this
subsection.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(s)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
152. The key to the controversy is whether the use of the word "shall" in the
statute indicates a mandatory intent by Congress. The statutory use of the word "shall"
generally indicates a mandatory intent in the statute, unless convincing evidence is provided to the contrary. C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 25.04 (4th
ed. 1973) (cited in Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1977)).
153. 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977).

[VOL. 27: 139, 1990]

Wetland Protection
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

mine the legislative intent of section 404(s).15 1 The court noted that
usual statutory interpretation dictates that unless a convincing argu-

ment is made to the contrary, the term "shall" indicates mandatory

intent." 5 After examining extrinsic evidence for its interpretation,

the court determined that it was inconclusive on the issue.1 55 Despite
the presumption of mandatory intent and inconclusive extrinsic evi-

dence of legislative intent to the contrary,
the Sierra Club court in157
terpreted the statute as discretionary.
Several subsequent decisions have used this interesting rationale to
conclude that enforcement was discretionary. 58 In one such case, the
court explained that if the EPA were forced to investigate and en-"
force all reported violations of the CWA, it would be impossible to
achieve the goal of the statute.5 9 Other courts refused to adopt the
154. Id. at 489-91. The court acknowledged that extrinsic aids to interpretation
are generally used only when the language of the statute is unclear or ambiguous. According to the court, however, when such evidence is available, there is no rule of law
against ignoring convention and using such evidence. Id. at 489.
155. Id.
156. The court used the administrative agency's interpretation, the legislative history, and the statute as a whole to clarify the issue. Id. at 489-91.
157. The court ruled that unless there is a strong argument that the administrative
agency in charge of the statute misconstrued its meaning, the construction by that
agency should prevail. Id. The court failed to resolve the issue by looking at the legislative intent or the statute as a whole, and therefore allowed the administrative agency's
construction to stand. Id. However, the administrative agency in this instance was also
the defendant in the case. Therefore, by effectively reversing the presumption of interpretation, the court has essentially allowed the agency-defendant to decide its own case.
158. For example, in Goodyear v. LeCraw, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,846, 20848 (S.D. Ga. 1980), the court found that the term "shall" did not make
enforcement of permit conditions mandatory (irrelevant in this case, which was for
nonpermitted fill), citing Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977). In Harmon
Cove Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh, 815 F.2d 949, 951 (3d Cir. 1987), a citizen suit to
require Corps investigation and enforcement of permit conditions was rejected, the court
noting that neither section 404 of the CWA nor section 10 of the River and Harbors Act
created such a mandatory duty. The court pointedly did not rule on whether enforcement
was mandatory if the Corps determined that the permittee was in violation. Harmon
Cove, 815 F.2d at 953 n.5.
In a related case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals supported the Sierra Club interpretation as the majority view in overturning a lower court's interpretation that the
legislative "spirit" required mandatory enforcement. Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943
(8th Cir. 1987). In Dubois, the court refused to find the legislative intent (primarily
testimony by Senator Muskie during the Senate hearings on the CWA amendments)
controlling, and relied instead on a "well established principle of judicial review [that]
the view of the agency charged with administering the statute is entitled to considerable
deference . . . ." Id. at 947; see also State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921
(4th Cir. 1977) (dictum); Zemansky v. EPA, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1447 (D.
Alaska 1986); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Ruckelshaus, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1776
(D.N.J. 1983).
159. Dubois, 820 F.2d at 947. The court cited the goal of the statute "to restore

reasoning of Sierra Club v. Train and, instead, have interpreted the
Act to require mandatory enforcement."' 0 This judicial ambiguity
has helped confuse the issue and emphasizes the need for congressional clarification of the statute's purpose.
9. Failure to Utilize Appropriate Remedies
When violations are discovered by the Corps or the EPA, the
agencies rarely use the full extent of legal remedies available to penalize the violator or to deter further violations."6 ' Instead of using
legal actions, the Corps usually pursues administrative solutions,
even if they take months or years to resolve. 62 Two common administrative remedies are to require the violators to restore the area to
its original conditions, 6 3 and to grant "after-the-fact" permits to the
violator. Such remedies are employed even where violations are repeated 64or are in open defiance to the Corps' orders to cease and
desist.
The Corps' administrative solutions to unauthorized activities generally begin with requesting voluntary compliance and negotiating
voluntary restoration of the area. 6 5 This enforcement tactic often
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id.
at 947. Instead, the EPA should have the discretion to allocate its resources toward the
enforcement of the most egregious violations. Id. By using such a rationale, the court
appears to be accepting the futility of CWA enforcement for small-scale violations that
could have significant cumulative impact.
More recently, a district court in Texas ruled that the Corps' decision not to enforce is
judicially unreviewable, but the Corps' interpretation of the extent of its jurisdiction is
reviewable. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher, 622 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Texas
1987).

160. See, e.g., Green v. Costle, 577 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D. Tenn. 1983); South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978); Illinois v. Hoffman,
425 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
161. The legal remedies available to the EPA and the Corps include civil and
criminal penalties levied against violators. In reviewing the activities of five Corps district
offices from 1984 to 1986, the GAO found that the Corps pursued no criminal actions,
and only six civil actions. Among these districts, two pursued no civil or criminal actions
at all during the three years surveyed, and one district did not maintain any records
regarding enforcement. In addition, only two monetary fines were imposed by the five
districts during this period (totaling $12,500). GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 66.
162. Corps district officials give several reasons for avoiding legal remedies, "including the high costs of adjudication, limited environmental impact of most violations,
perceived adversarial nature of some courts to the section 404 program, and the tendency
of violators to voluntarily restore affected areas." Id.
163. Id. at 67. In reviewing 87 unauthorized activities brought to the attention of
the Corps, the GAO found that the Corps required restoration in 36 cases, and issued
after-the-fact permits in 25 cases. Id. Despite temporal and spatial losses of wetland
functional values, mitigation was rarely required. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 68-72. By negotiating a compromise with the violator, the Corps allows
a temporal and net loss of wetland habitat, even if the restoration is completed. In addition, the scientific jury is still out regarding the ability of wetland restoration projects to
create a fully functional wetland ecosystem. See WETLAND CREATION, supra note 118.
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continues even when the unpermitted activity has not ceased during
the negotiation period.' 66 Similar tactics are used when violations of
permit conditions are discovered. 1
The other administrative enforcement tactic commonly used by
the Corps includes granting the violator an after-the-fact permit. 6 8
This strategy is chosen even for serious violators, persons who refuse
to comply with Corps cease and desist orders, and for repeat offenders. ' By accepting such applications, the Corps allows the applicant
to circumvent the entire section 404 process, including the section
404(b)(1) Guidelines compliance analysis, the practicable alternatives analysis, and the public review process. 170 In addition, by issuing an after-the-fact permit, the Corps may preclude EPA enforce166. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 70. The Corps views pursuing voluntary compliance instead of legal action as exercising "good government." Id. at 72. The Vicksburg
District Regulatory Branch Chief has acknowledged that the policy, which has continued
on the advice of the district's counsel, creates a problem in deterrence of unpermitted
activities. Id. at 70. When this avenue ultimately fails, the Corps seldom pursues legal
action. Id. at 67-71. The Department of Defense attributes this to the desire for quicker
action (through administrative action as opposed to judicial action), and the inability to
convince United States attorneys to pursue any but the most significant cases. Id. at 71.
167. The Corps rarely suspends or revokes permits when permit conditions are violated, choosing instead to seek voluntary compliance or to modify the permits to allow
the unauthorized activity. Id. at 72. In five Corps districts reviewed by the GAO, no
permits were revoked from 1984-1986. Id. This may be attributed to the lack of routine
inspections of permitted projects. Id. at 73. Without proper documentation of violations
through inspections, suspension or revocation actions cannot be processed. Id.
168. Id. at 67-71. After-the-fact permits are those granted by the Corps after the
discharge of fill has occurred. The Corps is not required to grant such permits before
pursuing an enforcement action. United States v. Cumberland Farms, Conn., Inc. 826
F.2d 1151, 1161 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988). These permits are
sometimes granted in exchange for an agreement to mitigate the damage at a nearby
site. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 67.
169. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 67-68. Conceding that this strategy may be
appropriate action in many cases, the GAO found that it was used at times where referral to United States attorneys for legal action was warranted. Id. For example, the Portland district office of the Corps issued two cease and desist orders to a violator that had
dumped 5000 cubic yards of fill into a wetland area without a permit. The GAO reports
that "[a]fter issuance of the first cease-and-desist order, the company made no effort to
avoid further wetland fill and consequently fresh fill continued to accumulate on the wetland. Currently, the Corps is pursuing voluntary restoration and plans to issue an afterthe-fact permit." Id. at 70. Based on the findings of the GAO study, this case is not
exceptional. Id. at 67-71.
170. All of these steps in the permit process are designed to provide input regarding whether or not the permit should be granted, the project modified, or both. By granting a permit after the project has been completed, the Corps has eliminated the period in
which these analyses are to occur. Nevertheless, resource agencies sometimes offer unsolicited comments on the unpermitted activity. However, their recommendations (usually
for permit denial and restoration) are often ignored. For specific examples in five Corps
districts, see id. at 68-72.

ment action by essentially legitimizing the previous illegal activities.
The EPA is also given independent enforcement powers against
unpermitted fills under the CWA and the 1987 amendments. 171 Regional EPA offices vary in their use of the enforcement program. 172
In addition to the permit elevation process, 1 3 section 404(c) allows
the EPA to veto any Corps permit decision if it feels the project will
adversely affect the aquatic ecosystem. 174 Despite the broad capabilities of this veto power, it is rarely used."' 5 However, the EPA may
become more active in the enforcement of section 404 now that it
has the power to levy administrative penalties."76 In the few cases
where civil actions are pursued, the general trend of the courts is to
impose heavy fines on violators unless the site is restored."17 While
this strategy provides incentive for the violator to restore the wetland
area, it ignores the temporal loss of wetland functional values and
works off 81the bold assumption that wetlands can be successfully
restored.'
10.

JurisdictionalRestrictions on the Availability of

Citizen Suits
As a result of broad judicial interpretations, many citizen suits are

decided on jurisdictional, rather than substantive grounds."' 9 As

171. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1319 (1988).
172. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 60. The number of enforcement actions by
each of the individual regions over a two year period (1986-1987) ranged from zero to
fifty-seven, with one region having no section 404 enforcement program at all over the
last eight years. Id. at 61.
173. See supra note 135.
174. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1982).
175. The EPA veto has been used only seven times through 1988. See supra note
63. It is believed that the threat of using the veto is almost as effective as using it. GAO
REPORT, supra note 5, at 51.
176. The EPA commenced 18 administrative enforcement actions in the 1988 fiscal year. See Liebesman, supra note 41, at 17.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Farms of Conn., Inc., 826 F.2d 1151
(1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988), where a willful violation brought a
$540,000 civil penalty, of which $150,000 was paid and the rest forgiven after restoration. In United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 87 (W.D. Ky. 1987), affd, 852 F.2d
189 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 113 (1989), a fine of $40,000 was to be
completely forgiven once restoration was completed.
178. The scientific community has not yet concluded that such efforts fully restore
wetland functional values. See WETLAND CREATION, supra note 118.
179. Substantive issues are often not reviewed in cases where standing is found to
be inadequate. The end result of these cases is that the violations which the lawsuit
intended to stop often go unchecked. For example, the majority view is that the Clean
Water Act does not require mandatory enforcement against unpermitted fill. See, e.g.,
Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1987); Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n v.
Marsh, 815 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1987); Goodyear v. LeCraw, 15 ENVTL. L, REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,846, 20,848 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1977). However, a strong minority has found that enforcement is mandatory. See, e.g.,
Green v. Costle, 577 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D. Tenn. 1983); South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v.
Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978); Illinois v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.
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mentioned earlier, courts have disagreed as to which sections of the
CWA actually create mandatory duties.8 0 The use of the section

404(b)(1) Guidelines in permit application review is treated as
mandatory by some courts and discretionary by others."8 ' The en-

forcement of provisions respecting violations reported to the EPA
and the Corps is likewise interpreted as a mandatory duty by some

courts and discretionary by others.' 82 Because most citizen suits are
based either on claims of erroneous permit review (failure to use the
Guidelines) or failure to enforce section 404 regulations, these deci83
sions are crucial to the effectiveness of the citizen suit provision.'
The issue was clarified somewhat in National Wildlife Federation

v. Laubscher.14 The court agreed that it lacked authority to review
Corps decisions not to take enforcement action, but held that it could
review the Corps' interpretation of the CWA that jurisdiction was
not authorized by statute.'

5

Still, considerable uncertainty sur-

rounds this issue, perhaps discouraging future investment of time
and money by citizen groups to challenge unauthorized activities.

Another limitation on citizen suits is that suits are not allowed if
the Corps or the EPA are "diligently prosecuting" enforcement ac-

tions.' 86 In the past, this debate centered around the threshold judicial action needed to constitute sufficient "diligent prosecution" to

preclude a citizen suit. 8 7 With the 1987 amendments to the CWA

Ill.
1977).
180. See cases cited supra note 179.
181. Use of the Guidelines was found to be mandatory in Bersani v. Robichaud,
850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1556 (1989), Buttrey v. United
States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1180 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983), and
Shoreline Assocs. v. Marsh, 555 F. Supp. 169 (D.Md. 1983), afid, 725 F.2d 677 (4th
Cir. 1984). However, in 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va.
1983), the court indicated that the Guidelines are merely a means to balance all of the
public and private interests regarding a project. National Audubon Soc'y v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,724 (D.N.J. 1983) (Applying a
lenient analysis of the Guidelines).
182. See cases cited supra note 181. The majority trend at this time is that if the
statute cannot clearly be shown to have intended a mandatory duty, then the duty will be
assumed to be discretionary by the agency administrator. See Sierra Club v. Train, 557
F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1977).
183. If both duties are found to be discretionary, the impact of citizen suits is
severely limited. Likewise, if both duties are considered mandatory, citizen suits have the
potential for greater impact on section 404 enforcement. The general intent of the statute
indicates that citizen suits are to be used as a supplementary enforcement tool and as a
type of watchdog mechanism. See supra note 71.
184. 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
185. Id. at 550.
186. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1988); see also supra note 69.
187. This argument revolves around the subjectivity of the term "diligently prose-

authorizing administrative penalties from the Corps and the EPA,
the question will likely advance to the threshold types of administrative action needed to preclude suits.
Finally, as an incentive for individuals to pursue responsible legal
actions against violators of the CWA, section 505 entitles "prevailing parties" to recover attorneys' fees and expert witness costs. 188
Attempts to limit this reimbursement award have met with mixed
results. The primary restriction on recovering attorneys' fees in citizen suits is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to recover them from
private party defendants. 189 The consequence of this restriction is
that if the administrative suit were brought against only a private
party, it would likely be reviewed de novo. However, if the Corps or
the EPA were party to the suit, the case would turn on whether decisions in the administrative record were "arbitrary and capricious,"
greatly reducing the availability of extrinsic evidence. 8 0
B. Recent Improvements
Despite the problems with the section 404 permitting program,
several recent changes indicate potential for more effective administration. The latest amendments to the CWA' 9 ' include several improvements in the enforcement powers of the CWA, including increased maximum civil and criminal penalties.9 2 Perhaps more
important is the new authority granted to the EPA and Corps to levy
administrative penalties against section 404 violators. 3 Without the
cumbersome procedure of judicial action, enforcement of section 404
cuting." Comment, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act: Waiting for Godot in the
Fifth Circuit, 62 TUL. L. REV. 175, 181 n.37 (1987).

188. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988); see also supra note 71.
189. Fees have been denied where the defendants were only nongovernment parties. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986). Where a
private defendant was misled by an erroneous wetland determination by the Corps, fees
were recovered from the government, and not from the private party defendants. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 315 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Ransel, The
Swamps-on-a-Hill Have Citizens on a Roll: The Fourth Circuit Advances the Citizen's
Cause in National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)

10,003 (1989).
190. Ransel, supra note 189.
191. The Water Quality Act of 1987 was passed in February 1987 over a veto by
President Reagan. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (1988)).
192. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), (d) (1988).
193. The new authority allows the EPA or the Corps to classify violations into two
classes. Class I violations carry maximum penalties of $10,000 per violation, with a maximum total fine of $25,000, and may be imposed after an informal hearing has been held
to allow the alleged violator to be heard. Class II violations require a formal hearing
under the rules of the Administrative Procedure Act and carry maximum penalties of
$10,000 per violation per day, with an aggregate maximum of $125,000. 33 U.S.C. §
1319(g) (1988).

Wetland Protection

[VOL. 27: 139, 1990]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

regulations is expected to increase dramatically.""

The EPA has

used this authority enthusiastically, initiating eighteen administrative penalty actions in fiscal year 1988.115 The Corps has yet to use

this new authority in pursuing violations of permit conditions.1 96
In January 1989, the Corps and the EPA entered into three Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) regarding the enforcement of section
404.19 In these MOAs, the EPA has taken a stronger position regarding final jurisdiction determinations. 198 This move may direct
future administration of the program toward wetlands protection.
The EPA's veto power was recently tested for the first time. In Ber-

sani v. Robichaud,'99 the Second Circuit upheld an -EPA veto, ruling
the use of the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines in permit review is

mandatory, and public interest review, which the Corps emphasizes
in permit processing, is discretionary.

00

The court emphasized that

the Corps may not approve a permit for any project that violates the
Guidelines, even if the public interest review indicates approval.2 0'
This endorsement of the EPA's influence in the section 404 program
is reflective of the court's interpretation of section 404 as a wetlands

protection statute.20

194. The streamlined enforcement process may also increase voluntary compliance
because potential violators will realize that the agency resources allocated to enforcement
will reach beyond the egregious violations. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 72.
195. Ransel, Significant Developments Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act:
The CWA Dredge and Fill Regulatory Program in 1988, at 6, in FOURTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON WETLANDS LAW AND REGULATION (A.B.A. May 11-12, 1989).

196. Id.
197. One of these memoranda concerns the allocation of enforcement responsibilities for section 404, one addresses enforcement procedures on previously issued Corps
permits, and the third deals with jurisdiction determinations and exempted activities
under section 404(0(1). For a general discussion of these MOAs see Ransel, EPA and
the Corps Enter Three MOAs on Allocation of Regulatory Responsibility Under the §
404 Program, 11(1) NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. 2 (1989).
198. While the Corps retains the authority to make wetlands jurisdictional determinations, they now must be done pursuant to EPA guidelines, and the EPA has the
final say in any interpretative or regulatory questions involving geographic jurisdiction or
exemptions. See id.
199. 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1556 (1989).
200. The court reasoned that the public interest review was "standardless," while
the Guidelines provided specific standards for evaluation. Id. at 39-40.
201. Id.
202. The EPA can conduct a de novo investigation of the Corps' practicable alternative analysis. Id. at 45. The test for a practicable alternative to the project weighs
what was available at the time the permit applicant entered the market for the project.
While this market entry analysis places a great burden on the developer to search for a
practicable alternative to filling wetland areas, it was deemed "consistent with the intent
of the CWA" by the court. Id. at 47. The EPA's skepticism toward using mitigation to
offset the filling of existing wetlands resources was accepted as reasonable by the court.

The courts also have recently clarified several important questions
with regard to citizen suits. Most noteworthy is the decision of the
Fourth Circuit in National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson.0 3 In
Hanson, the court held that citizen suits under section 505(a)(2)
may challenge jurisdictional decisions by the Corps and the EPA. 204
This type of enforcement suit is not specifically authorized by the
CWA; thus Hanson opens up new territory for future citizen suits. 20,
The court also concluded that despite the fact that section 505(a)(2)
explicitly provides for citizen suits against only the EPA administrator, the intent of the statute is to allow suits against the Corps as
well. o6
Perhaps the greatest impact of Hanson will come from its ruling
on the availability of attorneys' fees for plaintiffs.2 °1 The court found
that "prevailing parties," as intended by the writers of the statute,
need not win their cases outright. Rather, the parties are deemed
"prevailing" if the purposes of their lawsuits are met. When the
court ordered the wetlands determination remanded to the Corps,
the plaintiff was said to have prevailed for the purposes of section
505. 208 This decision also affirmed that under section 505(d), attorneys' fees should be computed at the prevailing community rates,
thus providing a greater incentive for counsel to accept such cases in
the future.20
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The section 404 regulatory program has a long way to go before it
is the effective national wetlands protection device envisioned by
Congress.2 10 To realize this goal, significant legislative and bureaucratic changes must occur to broaden the scope of jurisdiction and to
provide a more consistent administration of the program. Such
Bersani v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 405, 420 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), affd sub nom. Bersani v.
Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1556 (1989). The wetland involved was neither large nor spectacular and was protected for its inherent value
as a wetland. Kilgore, supra note 24, at 10,490. For an indepth review of Bersani and
how it has increased the EPA's role in the section 404 program, see Kilgore, supra note
24.
203. 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988).
204. The suit challenged a wetlands determination that was alleged to be "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 316.
205. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
206. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 316. This argument had been forwarded by the Corps in
other cases, but was not specifically ruled on until now. See Ransel, supra note 187, at
10,007.
207. The plaintiff in Hanson recovered attorneys' fees of over $400,000. See Ransel, supra note 195, at 8.
208. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 316-17.
209. For an indepth analysis of the Hanson decision, see Ransel, supra note 187.
210. See generally LEGISrLTIvE HISTORY, supra note 24; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1982).
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changes will not occur overnight, and in the interim, wetlands will
continue to be irreparably lost. However, enforcement of the present
form of the section 404 program would be greatly enhanced by a
broader use of the citizen suit provision. Although legislative
changes to the program are needed, citizen suits could be used for
more immediate improvements.
A.

Long-Term Modifications

1. A Comprehensive Wetlands Program

The most pressing problem with the section 404 program is its
limited scope. While the program has received criticism for its effectiveness, most of the wetland acreage lost each year falls outside section 404 jurisdiction.21 ' Ultimately, the answer to this problem is a
National Wetlands Protection Program that regulates all activities

directly or indirectly affecting wetlands. There are precedents for
such comprehensive legislation.2 12 The new program would administer section 404, as well as oversee the regulation of operations such
as wetlands draining or flooding and agricultural conversion. Coordination and cooperation between agencies would be crucial to this
program, much as it is in the administration of the Endangered Species Act.21 3
211. Section 404 only regulates wetland loss caused by dredge and fill operations.
Wetland loss from flooding, draining and clearcutting are not regulated by section 404
(or any other wetland protection policy). See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 19; OTA,
WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 167.
212. For example, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 currently
regulates all activities in the navigable waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1982). In addition, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 was enacted to protect the
nation's heritage of fish, wildlife and plants. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982)).
These programs could provide a model for the administration of the new wetlands
program.
213. The Endangered Species Act provides in part:
§ 1536. Interagency cooperation.
(a) Federal agency actions and consultations
(1) The Secretary shall review other programs administered by him and utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. All other
Federal agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by
carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title.
(2) Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance
of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an "agency action") is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or

Uniform records regarding the regulatory history of specific wetland areas would be standardized and centralized under such a system to facilitate communication between agencies. 214 This standardization would also make it easier to assess cumulative impacts,
determine sensitive areas for EPA protection, and evaluate the success of the regulatory program, while preventing destructive activities from escaping jurisdiction.21 The creation of such a system
should be urgently encouraged; however, immediate enactment of
such a program is unlikely.
2. Statutory Changes
Because sweeping changes in the nature of federal wetlands protection is unlikely, Congress can nonetheless improve the existing
system. Since the congressional hearings on the amendments to the
CWA,218 the debate persists regarding the proper agency to administer the section 404 regulatory program. 1 7 The resulting bifurcation
of enforcement duties, however well intentioned, has led to inadequate administration and enforcement of the Act. The time has
come for one agency-the EPA-to assume all of the administrative
duties under the Act."" The reasons for this change are simple and
the improvements to the section 404 program would be substantial.
By placing administration of the section 404 program with an
agency that has a historic mission of protecting the environment,
rather than permit processing (as the Corps does), Congress would
send an unambiguous message that the purpose of the statute is to
protect wetland ecosystems. 219 Consolidation under the EPA would
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species ....
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1982).
A similar provision should be included in a National Wetlands Program to ensure that
all governmental agencies are mandated to effectuate the Program's intent.
214. Improved communication would allow a more efficient allocation of administrative resources when separate agencies are reviewing permit applications. Because limited resources is a recurring complaint from agency personnel, such a system should alleviate some of the problems with time constraints.
215. One such activity that escapes regulation is the granting of exemptions from
permit requirements for agricultural projects under section 404(0. See 33 U.S.C. §
1344(0 (1982). In many cases, once such an exemption is granted and the land is
farmed for a few years, it is then developed without further permit review. Such actions
are difficult to detect because current records by the Corps often fail to provide the history of the particular area.
216. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 24.
217. See OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 167.
218. The EPA already has general jurisdiction over the regulations in the CWA
under 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1982). In addition, the EPA is assuming an increasingly
powerful role in section 404 administration, as evidenced by the three recent Memoranda
of Agreement between the Corps and EPA. See Ransel, supra note 197.
219. This intent is apparently not clear to the Corps of Engineers. See OTA, WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 12, at 167.
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also reduce the jurisdictional and interpretive inconsistencies that
have plagued the program. Additionally it would facilitate communication and coordination with other resource agencies, such as the
Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service. More specifically, permit review activities would regularly use
the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and would likely stress practicable
alternatives analysis and cumulative impacts assessment. 220 Finally,
enforcement and full use of available remedies would be conducted
more enthusiastically with just one agency to shoulder the blame for
ineffective administration. 21
While not a panacea for the problems with the system,2 2 2 EPA
administration would certainly add some consistency to the section
404 program. Congress may also consider several minor amendments
to the CWA that would have immediate impact on its effectiveness
in wetlands protection. Suggestions for these amendments include:
(1) Requiring cumulative impacts review of all individual activities
which fall under general permits; 223 (2) creating a timetable for actions taken on reported violations; 224 and (3) redefining the public
interest review process to make it more predictable. 25
B.

Immediate Solutions

1. Expand Citizen Suit Availability
Notwithstanding the need for new legislation and statutory
changes in section 404, the program is currently constructed to protect much more of the wetlands resource than it has historically pro220. These are all areas that the EPA has stressed in the current partial administration of section 404, but they have been largely mishandled by the Corps. See GAO
REPORT, supra note 5, at 26-29.

221. With a single-agency administration, confusion would diminish regarding
which agency's duty it is to enforce against unauthorized activities. Id. at 55.
222. Just as in the Corps, EPA policy decisions regarding a particular project or
region are subject to the interpretation of regional officials. In addition, the EPA record
on enforcement of the current program is not spotless. Id. at 60-62.
223. No such review has yet been adopted, and the Corps has denied that it is its
job to investigate such impacts. See supra notes 111, 114 and accompanying text.
224. There is currently no explicit timetable for enforcement decisions when unauthorized activities are reported. However, statutory regulations do include a timetable for
permit processing. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1982). A parallel provision for enforcement action is needed.
225. The Corps currently uses no standard pattern for reviewing permits during
the public interest review period and it considers mitigation throughout the public interest balancing process. This makes it difficult for other agencies to evaluate and comment
on the permit applications, and it provides the Corps with extraordinary discretion on
how specific factors should be considered. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 37-39.

tected. The inability of the program to realize its potential stems in
large part from lack of enforcement.228 While awaiting statutory
changes to improve the program, citizens can immediately effect enforcement through more aggressive use of the citizen suit provision.
Several recent cases have increased the capabilities for citizens to
sue under section 505 of the CWA and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 27 These cases can be utilized to resolve some of
the major problems with the section 404 program as it is currently
administered.
In Bersani v. Robichaud,228 the Second Circuit ruled that the
Corps has a mandatory duty to base its permit decisions on the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.229 While this case has received considerable attention for its ruling upholding the EPA's practicable alternatives analysis, 23 0 it may become more significant as a tool for citizen
suits. Section 505 of the CWA allows citizens to sue either the EPA
or the Corps when these agencies fail to perform a duty that is nondiscretionary under CWA.2 31 By ruling that the use of the Guidelines is mandatory under section 404(b), 3 2 the Second Circuit
opened the door for citizen suits to compel Guideline use by the
Corps.
In National Wildlife Federationv. Hanson,33 the Fourth Circuit
determined that citizens may bring suit under 505(a)(2) to challenge
a Corps wetland determination. The court based its decision on the
Corps' "nondiscretionary duty to regulate dredged or fill material"
deposited into wetlands, and in so doing, to "make reasoned wetlands
determinations. ' 234 This requirement to make "reasoned determinations" allows citizens to hold the Corps accountable for its rationale
in decisions not to pursue enforcement remedies against known violators. The court based its review on the APA standard, which allows
courts to "set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions found
to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 2 33 The court
226. Id. at 55-74.
227. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
228. 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1556 (1989).
229. The court emphasized that no permit may be issued for activities that would
violate the Guidelines, even if the Corps public interest review indicates that it should be
granted. Id. at 39.
230. Kilgore, supra note 24, at 10,487-90.
231. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
232. Id. § 1344(b).
233. 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988). This decision presumably extends reviewability
to include other jurisdictional decisions. See Ransel, supra note 187, at 1003.
234. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 315. In making a reasoned decision, "[t]he Corps has a
mandatory duty to ascertain the relevant facts, correctly construe the applicable statutes
and regulations, and properly apply the law to the facts." Id. at 315-16.
235. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The court used this standard because the CWA
does not establish a standard for reviewing jurisdictional determinations by the Corps or
the EPA. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 315; see also Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
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also ruled that using a standard of review to evaluate permit decisions which lies outside the CWA does not preclude the ability to
award attorneys' fees to the plaintiff under CWA section 505(d).23 6
3 the disFinally, in National Wildlife Federationv. Laubscher,1
trict court held that agency decisions not to take enforcement actions
are not judicially reviewable.238 However, an agency's interpretation
of a regulatory statute is reviewable.23 9 As a result, in cases that
hinge on crucial statutory interpretations, citizens are allowed to
challenge the interpretation chosen by the agency in question.240
These findings create a foothold for litigating the crucial issues of
section 404. More importantly, they provide a framework for evaluating the possibility of initiating a citizen suit to question specific
agency actions. The vulnerability of agency actions on a given issue
is roughly estimated by asking two questions. First, is there a nondiscretionary duty stipulated under section 404 that either the Corps or
the EPA has failed to complete? If so, section 505 will provide the
proper jurisdiction for a citizen suit to compel action on that duty.
Second, is there an interpretation issue or an agency decision that
lacks sufficient reasoning so as to be deemed "arbitrary and capricious"? If so, a citizen suit to remand the decision or interpretation
for proper analysis is grounded on section 706 of the APA.24 ' Answering these questions with respect to some of the perceived problem areas of section 404 reveals that many of these issues are immediately vulnerable to citizen suit challenges. These challenges may
immediately bring about some of the needed changes in the system.
2. Challenge Assertions of Wetlands Jurisdiction
Following the lead of Hanson, future challenges to wetlands determinations are expected.242 Through Hanson, the Corps received notice that it is now required to regulate fill activities in wetlands, and
that simply stating that an area is not wetlands, without supporting
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 904 (5th Cir. 1983).
236. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 316.
237. 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
238. Id. at 550.
239. Id.
240. These statutory interpretation cases would likely turn on whether the agency
administering the act (and interpreting the statute) was reasonable in its interpretation,
or they may be based on the APA "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
241. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see also Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 904 (5th Cir. 1983).
242. These would include challenges on whether a given area was considered a
wetland, as well as on the landward extent of acknowledged wetland areas.

data, is no longer acceptable to the courts.2 43 With increasing scientific information available to make sound wetlands determinations,
courts may find it simpler to determine whether or not such decisions
are reasoned. Likewise, citizens may find it easier to challenge erroneous wetlands determinations under section 505 because there is
now a general standard which the Corps must use in its decisions.
3. Compel Proper Use of Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines
Perhaps the area of section 404 administration most vulnerable to
citizen suits is the Corps' failure to use the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines in its permitting decisions. The use of the Guidelines is
mandatory under section 505 jurisdiction. 244 The Guidelines emphasize that "[t]he permitting authority must address all of the relevant provisions of the Guidelines in reaching a Finding of Compliance in an individual case. ' 245 Nevertheless, several sections of the
Guidelines are routinely ignored by the Corps. 246 The failure
to ad247
dress the Guidelines could be a basis of a citizen suit.
The manner in which the Corps uses the Guidelines in the permit
review process is not in accordance with the intent of the statute.2 4 8
The Corps' decision to refrain from using the Guidelines sequentially, as mandated,249 is an issue for a future citizen suit challenging
this policy as an "arbitrary and capricious" use of discretion.250 In
addition, the Corps completely circumvents the Guidelines when it
issues after-the-fact permits. Important (and mandatory) sections of
the Guidelines, which pertain to minimizing environmental impacts
through project modification prior to the issuance of a permit, are
ignored under this policy. 2 1 In addition, public and other govern243. Hanson, 859 F.2d at 315-16.
244. Mandatory use was affirmed in Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 39-40 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1556 (1989).
245. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.5(1) (1989) (emphasis added).
In addition, all of the requirements of § 230.10 (restrictions on discharge) must be met.
Id. at § 230.10.
246. See Liebesman, The Role of EPA's Guidelines in the Clean Water Act § 404
Permit Program-JudicialInterpretationand Administrative Application, 14 ENVTL. L
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,272, 10274 (1984).
247. The mandatory duty to regulate fill operations also provides a basis for suits
to compel proper use of the Guidelines. The Guidelines acknowledge that not every section of the Guidelines will apply in its entirety to a particular activity. EPA § 404(b)(1)

Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 203.6(a) (1989). As a result, the discussion here is confined to
only those sections that would require compliance in all permits.
248. The Guidelines explicitly state the sequence which should be used in evaluating a permit application. 40 C.F.R. § 230.5 (1989). However, the Corps maintains that a
stepwise approach to the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines is not required. Barrows, supra
note 90, at 12.
249.
250.
lines as a
251.

See supra notes 86, 90 and accompanying text.
This issue may also be challenged by characterizing the misuse of the Guidefailure to act on a mandatory duty.
EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.70-.77 (1989).
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mental agencies are precluded from commenting on after-the-fact
permits since the fill has already occurred. This policy is subject to
challenge because of the Corps' failure to act on a nondiscretionary
duty. It is also subject to challenge under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.2 52
4.

Compel Proper Alternatives Analysis

The Guidelines explicitly require that practicable alternatives be
sought for a project that involves filling of wetlands. 53 In Bersani,
the Second Circuit upheld the EPA's use of "market entry" alternatives analysis when issuing a permit veto.254 While the court stopped
short of endorsing this method of alternatives analysis for all permits, it sent a message that the statute calls for a strict analysis.2 55
This strict standard, combined with explicit statutory language declaring that wetlands be filled only as a last resort, 56 indicates that
the Corps' alternatives analysis policies are subject to challenge in
the courts as "arbitrary and capricious. 257
In particular, the Corps' practice of allowing permit applicants to
provide their own definition of the "purpose of the project," which is
later used to determine if there is a practicable alternative to the
project, 258 rarely reveals alternatives. This policy is subject to citizen
suit scrutiny because it forsakes the purpose of the statute for efficiency in permit processing. In addition, non-water-dependent
projects2 59 are presumed to have less damaging practicable alternatives "unless clearly demonstrated otherwise. ' 260 The Corps' ability
to credibly meet this standard when it issues permits for projects
that are not water dependent could be challenged immediately.

252. Authority for these two arguments derives from section 505, 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a) (1988), and APA jurisdictional review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
253. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1989).
254. Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 43-45 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1556 (1989).
255. Id. at 43-48.
256. EPA §404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1989).
257. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
258. This practice permits definition in a way that makes the proposed fill site the
only possible location for the project. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
259. See supra note 48.
260. See EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (1989).

5.

Compel Consideration of Cumulative Impacts

Investigation and documentation of cumulative impacts of each individual project is also required by the Guidelines.2 6 ' The failure by
the Corps to consider cumulative impacts in permit decisions is well
documented 262 and in many cases this policy is vulnerable to attack
by citizen suits as a failure to act on a nondiscretionary duty. While
this may change if the recently developed protocol for cumulative
impacts assessment is adopted by the EPA and the Corps,263 it remains to be seen how these guidelines will be used. It is likely that
the Corps will retain the policy of not considering cumulative impacts for individual activities under general permits. 2 4 However, this
policy is ripe for challenge as indicated by United States v. Marathon.265 In Marathon, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
that individual water quality certifications may be required for each
activity under a general permit. 26 Likewise, compelling assessments
of cumulative impacts from individual actions under general permits
may become a target for future litigation.
6. Compel Proper Use of Mitigation
The EPA requires mitigation when there is absolutely no alternative but to destroy an area of wetlands. 6 7 The Corps has misread
this policy to allow the use of mitigation as a tradeoff for developing
wetlands, and it considers mitigation throughout its permit review
process to balance adverse impacts.266 This interpretation directly
conflicts with the EPA, which uses mitigation sparingly and which
does269not use mitigation as an affirmative tradeoff for wetlands
loss. There is legal precedent for actions based on inadequate mitigation,27 ° and similar actions may be used to challenge the wrongful
use of mitigation by the Corps in its public interest review.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.11(g) (1989).
See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 28-32.
See Gosselink & Lee, supra note 114.
GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 28-32.
United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96 (Ist Cir. 1989).

266.

Id. at 101.

267. EPA § 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (1989).
268. Barrows, supra note 90, at 12.
269. The policy of the EPA, which is echoed in the section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, is
that "it is appropriate to consider mitigation after you have gone through, first, attempting to avoid the loss of the wetland; second, trying to minimize the impact of the proposed project; third, trying to repair or rehabilitate that which would still be damaged;
fourth, by reducing the impact over time by preservation and maintenance; and finally by
compressing, after all of those steps have been gone through, for remaining unavoidable
loss." Ciupek, supra note 86, at 12 (quoting Jennifer Joy Wilson, EPA Assistant Administrator of External Affairs).
270. See Russo Dev. Co. v. Thomas, No. 87-3916 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 1989).
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7. Compel Use of Agency Recommendations
Recommendations by resource agencies on permit issuance or denial are supposed to be given "full consideration" in the final deciIn addision of whether to grant or modify a permit application.
tion, use of resource agency recommendations is mandated by the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA).2 Still, the Corps
often disregards these recommendations, issuing permits despite resource agency objections.2 7 3 Arguably, the Guidelines and the
FWCA create a mandatory duty to consider resource agency recommendations and to either incorporate agency input into the final permit decisions or to provide satisfactory rationale for its exclusion.
Although this theory has not yet been tested in a citizen suit, this
reasoning may be used to challenge the silent rejection of agency
recommendations in future permit decisions.
8.

Compel Enforcement Actions

The puzzling and contradictory interpretations of the duty to enforce section 404 provisions remains an unsettled issue.2 74 The decision in Hanson, that the Corps has a "nondiscretionary duty to regulate fill," should lend support to the argument that enforcement
actions, at least for known violations, are mandatory for the purposes
of section 505 cases. At the very least, Hanson may aid the citizens'
cause by applying the "reasoned wetland determination" standard to
nonenforcement decisions as well. 75
9.

Other Areas to Expand Citizen Suits

The ability of prevailing parties in citizen suits to recover attorneys' fees and costs from the government when the court "determines that the award is appropriate" is well established.Y While
these costs are also available from the permit violators themselves,27 7
271. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(c) (1989). The CWA also requires acceptance of agency
participation in the permit process. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(e), 1344(m) (1982).
272. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1982); see also 33 C.F.R. § 320.3(e) (1989).
273. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 52.
274. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
275. In Hanson, the court found a mandatory duty to make a reasoned wetlands
determination based on the information available. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson,
859 F.2d 313, 315 (4th Cir. 1988).
276. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982); see also 'Hanson, 859 F.2d 313; Avoyelles
Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1986).
277. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982).

courts have balked at ordering their payment from private parties,
noting permit applicants' honest efforts to comply with section 404
regulations as explained to them by Corps officials.27 8 In cases where
the violator lacked good intentions, courts are less hesitant to award
attorneys' fees.27 9 The CWA explicitly authorizes recovery of fees
from private parties.2 8 0 This area could be expanded.
The allowable method for calculating recoverable fees was addressed in Hanson.21 This method calculates attorneys' fees based
on the rates available at the time of litigation, but fees are awarded
only after the final decision.28 2 Environmental cases often extend
over several years and, therefore, require either considerable capital
for retainer fees, or patience on the part of the attorney.28 a This restrictive policy could be challenged as contrary to Congress' intent
expressed in the citizen suit provision.
Another area subject to future citizen suits is the advanced identification of sensitive areas of the EPA, which precludes permitted operations in EPA-designated "sensitive areas. ' 28 4 Historically, this authority has been used sparingly by the EPA, presumably because of
lack of resources. In a proactive effort to stem the loss of wetlands,
citizen groups may consider suing to compel the designation of certain areas as "sensitive lands." The CWA is silent on the availability
of such actions, although designating "sensitive areas" could provide
a valuable tool for limiting destruction of selected wetlands.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite overwhelming public support for the protection of wetlands and a regulatory framework that should significantly limit wetlands destruction, the nation's wetlands continue to disappear. The
section 404 program is burdened with contradictory administration,
misinterpreted guidelines, and ambiguous court decisions. Understaffed agencies have allocated their resources to streamline the regulatory process and to protect against only the most egregious losses.
Meanwhile, piecemeal losses of wetland habitat, by the thousands,
add up to a collective catastrophic loss. Recent changes in the Act
indicate that section 404 administration is improving; however, action from Congress is needed if the "no net loss" goal of wetland
278. See Hanson, 859 F.2d at 319.
279. E.g., United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 627 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 769
F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (Court awarded

attorney and expert witness fees paid by the violator to the government).
280. See supra notes 67, 71.
281.

Hanson, 859 F.2d at 316.

282. Id. at 316-17.
283. Ransel, supra note 189, at 10,007.
284. The EPA is authorized to designate sensitive habitat areas in advance that
would preclude future permitted activities. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c)(1982).
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protection is to be realized. In the meantime, citizen groups can facilitate considerable improvement by pursuing new angles in citizen
lawsuits.
TED GRISWOLD

